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Abstract 
The spread of the Internet and development of e-commerce technology have redefined commercial 
transactions, and a succession of attempts to embody actual transactions has proliferated in the 
e-commerce environment. Several studies have been continuously attempted to embody the function 
of negotiations in the e-commerce environment, since negotiations have been performed in most 
transactions except those at a fixed price. This study presents various alternative plans for the 
multiattribute negotiation between purchasers and sellers to embody the automated negotiation system 
in the e-commerce environment and proposes a method of creating and evaluating an optimum 
negotiation plan according to user characteristics. 
 
Keywords: Negotiation; Multi attributes negotiation; Automated negotiation methods 
 
1. ???????????? 
The rapid spread of the Internet and the progress of related technology have redefined existing 
commercial transactions. In particular, e-commerce transcends time and space barriers between sellers 
and consumers in actual commercial transactions. The scale grows rapidly along with the reduction of 
economic costs, enhancement of the convenience of use, and decrease in transaction costs (Se jin Oh 
et al, 2002; Ui sung Cho et al, 1999). 
Most transactions except those at a fixed price are carried out through negotiations in actual 
transactions. In other words, negotiation is a main factor in commercial transactions. Studies to 
embody actual negotiations in e-commerce through agents have been conducted along with the 
expansion of the e-commerce market. Still, most existing studies on an automated negotiation, i.e., 
agents carrying out negotiations automatically, are insufficient since they deal with the negotiation 
support system as goods retrieval for e-commerce or comparative retrieval of the same goods. 
Despite the importance of negotiation and spread of e-commerce, the automated negotiation system 
has yet to be realized fully owing to the difficulty of negotiation itself and negotiation automation 
(Carrie et al, 1997). This problem notwithstanding, an automated negotiation system is necessary for 
coping with environmental changes and complicated problems and carrying out various negotiations 
efficiently. 
Activating negotiation in e-commerce will bring about other various negotiations at the same time; 
still, people alone can neither handle such various negotiations nor afford to wait for them to occur. 
Therefore, an automated negotiation system, i.e., negotiation is carried out automatically, is necessary 
to solve this problem. 
This study defines the multiattribute negotiation using three  negotiation items and examines the 
negotiation methodology from the seller’s viewpoint. The negotiation process is classified into two 
parts: (1) the alternative plan of negotiation changed by entropy is formed at the seller’s place 
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vis-à-vis production schedule, cost, and quality, and; (2) a negotiation plan is formed considering the 
penalty for delayed negotiation, seller’s negotiation characteristic by utility function, and certainty of 
the success of the negotiation plan to make it cope with the negotiation plan of the other party. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 examines the present condition and 
limitations of the existing negotiation system; Chapter 3 defines multiattribute negotiation and 
formulates and evaluates a negotiation plan; Chapter 4 describes the drawing process of the 
negotiation plan by negotiation generator using the valuation results, and; Chapter 5 discusses the 
limitations, recommendations, and future research directions. 
 
2. Review of Related Literature 
Negotiation is a form of intention decision in search of a solution to realize a common aim by more 
than two participants (Rosenschein et al, 1994). After examining the existing negotiation studies, 
Jelassi (1989) and Forough (1995) presented a design for a negotiation system in support of 
negotiation with emphasis on human factors such as behaviorism, recognition difference, and 
negotiation theory. Nunamaker et al (1991) reported the results of an experiment using a negotiation 
support system to solve the negotiation problem regarding bilateral agreements. On the other hand, 
Sycara et al (1996) and Dajun et al (1996) designed protocols to exchange proposal and 
counterproposals between agents and developed the automated negotiation system called Bazaar 
based on such protocols. The Bayesian probability theory is used for learning in Bazaar. Sandholm et 
al (1995) proposed an upgraded version of the Contract Net Protocol for dispersed work allotment in 
the dispersion of Artificial Neural Networks. Chavez et al (1996) did a research on Kasbah or the 
negotiation market, negotiating with many people in the central market . Oliver (1996) applied the 
heredity algorithm as a learning to devise a negotiation strategy. On the other hand, the supporting 
transaction model was designed to support auction, bid, and transformed auction by the Michigan 
Internet AuctionBot (auction.eecs.umich.edu), Cathay Pacific (www.cathaypacifc.com), Onsale 
(www.osale.com), JEM Computers (www.jemcomp.com), and Koll-Dove (www.koll-dove.com). 
Studies supporting various negotiations by system were performed in various fields and could be 
classified into two parts: negotiation support system (NSS) and setting the final goal of perfect 
negotiation automation. 
NSS supports the negotiation process instead of negotiation automation. This system provides the 
necessary decision-making information in the negotiation process and an electronic conversation 
channel. Unlike an automated negotiation agent, NSS depends on people for the input of restrictions, 
resolving early problems, and final decision making. NSS is divided into Solution-Driven NSS and 
Process Support NSS.  
Solution-Driven NSS offers alternative plans and various methods. Social Judgment Theory Models, 
Hypergame Decision Models, Bargaining Models, and Multiobjective Linear Programming draw 
these plans, and an expert system is used. On the other hand, Process Support NSS supports various 
communication channels and bilateral agreements instead of presenting alternative plans. Most of the 
NSSs are Solution-Driven NSS, embodying the environment of group meeting (Yuan et al, 1998). 
 Finally, the ultimate goal of perfect negotiation automation is set. Automated negotiations are 
possible using a single computer or several mutually connected computers to emphasize that 
automated negotiations are carried out by computers without relying on people. Despite the 
complication of a face-to-face negotiation, the automated negotiation agents in existing studies did not 
demand a corresponding complicated process (Beam et al, 1996). Pattie et al (1994) stressed that 
some of the characteristics of mutually connected intellectual agents include their complicated 
environment and intellectual behavior compared to the simplicity of an individual agent. 
Kasbah is an example of an automated negotiation agent that is not connected with the network 
(Chavez et al, 1996). As a center-based electronic market, Kasbah supports a transaction process 
using intellectual agents and a single-attribute negotiation agent using the price ascent strategy of the 
buyer and price relief strategy of the seller. 
On the other hand, instrument learning is used for automated negotiation.  
Oliver (1996) introduced an agent learning using the heredity algorithm to teach agents more 
effective ways of negotiation. Shaheen et al (2004) studied the formation of negotiation strategies and 
maintenance of balance to cope with the counterpart’s strategy using the game theory. 
Still, it is difficult to apply existing studies to actual transactions. This is because the method of 
substituting the people’s role in the automated negotiation system, which still requires the intervention 
of people, has yet to be developed. For example, in case of negotiation, negotiation alternatives are 
created after determining the negotiation attribute and evaluated considering the environments and the 
counterpart’s strategy. A negotiation plan is then presented according to the evaluation results.  
Existing studies on automated negotiation failed to develop the method of substituting people’s 
recognition system and discernment. Therefore, this study embodies people’s recognition system and 
discernment in actual negotiations through the automated negotiation methodology.  
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Getting out of the existing automated negotiation system focusing on the price which is a single 
attribute, negotiation alternatives are created considering various attributes available for negotiation, 
and the evaluation and proposal of negotiation alternatives are investigated considering factors in 
actual negotiation such as the negotiation time, user’s utility of negotiation substitutes, and possibility 
of success according to the counterpart. 
 
3. Formation and Valuation of Negotiation alternatives 
Decision makers evaluate negotiation attributes according to various standards of judgment and 
decide a preference order of the substitutes through such valuation. When negotiating with their 
counterparts, participants determine the environmental factors affecting the occurrence of negotiation 
as attributes. This chapter defines the negotiation environments and examines the solving process of 
negotiation. The formation and valuation of negotiation alternatives are also described. 
 
3.1 Definition of negotiation environment 
Sellers and buyers participating in the negotiation negotiate to maximize their profits. The 
negotiation attributes of participants selling and buying standardized goods include the goods, 
quantities of goods, and price of goods. In case of order negotiations, however, negotiation attributes 
include the price of goods, time limit for delivery, and quality. This is because a buyer wants to buy 
products with good quality and at a low price at his/her preferred date, whereas a seller wants to 
receive an order at a high price in the range of productive capacity. The profit sought by negotiation 
participants varies considerably according to the environment of negotiation. In this study, negotiation 
environment is defined as the negotiation environment between the seller and buyer in the order 
manufacture, since dealing with negotiation in the negotiation environment is difficult. The research 
range is limited to the negotiation environment of order manufacture. Since the production form of 
order manufacture is equipped for a system of various kinds and small production, production is 
decided by an order of a buyer. Most contracts are also concluded by negotiations. The environment 
of order manufacture is the most suitable environment for expressing negotiation. Negotiations occur 
in the order manufacture because a seller cannot accept the demand of a buyer completely, which, in 
turn, is either due to the difficulty of a seller to keep his/her appointed date owing to the limit of 
productive capacity or the rising price of goods as a result of keeping the appointed date. Negotiations 
of order manufacture refer to negotiations between a buyer and a seller regarding the ordered goods, 
and order splitting does not occur. This study assumes that the same goods are not repeatedly 
produced and assigns the price, time limit for delivery, and quality as negotiation variables. 
Transaction progresses through the bargaining method, and a negotiation plan is formed based on the 
price, time limit for delivery, and quality in a trade-off relationship. 
 
3.2 Formation of negotiation substitutes 
The main items of negotiation alternatives in the order manufacture include the price, time limit for 
delivery, and quality. Similarly, sellers make negotiation alternatives consisting of the price, time 
limit for delivery, and quality considering the existing production plan, production cost required to 
produce goods, and input cost changed by the alteration of quality. Finally, the order manufacture 
enterprise determines the range of negotiation based on the price, time limit for delivery, and quality 
through the production schedule system. 
Park et al (2004) conducted a study on the formation of negotiation alternatives through the 
production schedule in the environment of order manufacture, and the performance of this 
methodology was verified through various experiments. This study applies the schedule methodology 
based on the heredity algorithm proposed by Park et al (2004) to the formation of negotiation 
substitutes. <Figure 1> shows the entire process of negotiation in the environment of order 
manufacture, which describes the process of negotiation starting from negotiating through a request to 
buy from the first buyer, setting up negotiation alternatives through the schedule system, and 
presenting an optimum negotiation plan through the evaluation of each negotiation substitute. 
 
<Figure 1> Negotiations process 
 
 
 
The change of production schedule should be considered by negotiation attribute and existing 
production plan of sellers, and the fluctuations in prices, by change of quality, in order to make 
negotiation alternatives according to the order of buyers. The value of negotiation alternatives is 
evaluated according to the preference of sellers regarding negotiation alternatives after the formation 
of negotiation alternatives reflects these considerations. The weight of a negotiation item using 
entropy measure and subjective weight of sellers is used to reflect the preference of sellers. The 
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negotiation alternatives made from the schedule system is composed of attributes such as price, time 
limit for delivery, and quality, with the formation of negotiation alternatives using the schedule 
system resulting in the negotiation alternatives shown in <Table 1>. Each negotiation substitute of 
A1~A21 is composed of attributes such as price, time limit for delivery, and quality in a trade-off 
relationship. The quality is grasped by quantitative factor of top, middle, and bottom and considered 
by cost factor in decision making. Therefore, the top as the highest quality shows an attribute value of 
the lowest, and the bottom as the lowest quality, an attribute value of the highest.  
 
<Table 1> Generating negotiation alternatives 
Attribute of Negotiation Substitutes 
Negotiation Substitutes 
C1 (cost) 
C2 (time limit for 
delivery) C3 (quality) 
A1 40000 50 Top (75) 
A2 38200 55 Top (75) 
A3 36400 60 Top (75) 
A4 34600 65 Top (75) 
A5 32800 70 Top (75) 
A6 31000 75 Top (75) 
A7 29200 80 Top (75) 
A8 37300 58 Middle (80) 
A9 35500 63 Middle (80) 
A10 33700 68 Middle (80) 
A11 31900 73 Middle (80) 
A12 30100 78 Middle (80) 
A13 28300 83 Middle (80) 
A14 26500 88 Middle  (80) 
A15 32800 55 Bottom (90) 
A16 31000 60 Bottom (90) 
A17 29200 65 Bottom (90) 
A18 27400 70 Bottom (90) 
A19 25600 75 Bottom (90) 
A20 23800 80 Bottom (90) 
A21 22000 85 Bottom (90) 
Such value of the negotiation plan undergoes the process of evaluating the worth of negotiation 
alternatives using entropy measure and subjective weight.  
 
3.3 Valuation of multiattribute negotiation alternatives using entropy measure 
This study applied the Multiattribute Decision Making (MADM) method to the valuation method of 
negotiation substitutes. MADM standardizes the negotiation items with the measure of a different 
standard with the same standard, shows the valuation value of each substitute for the comparison of 
each substitute, and supports the identification of optimum substitutes by giving subjective weight to 
each item. 
In applying MADM to this paper, the following signs are defined: 
 
n: Number of the entire attribute  
m: Number of the entire negotiation plan 
Ai: Negotiation alternatives of i turn 
Cj: j turn attribute of negotiation substitutes 
xij: Attribute Cj value of negotiation plan Ai 
      C1 C2 C3   
A1  x11 x12 x13   
D= 
A2  x21 x22 x23   
        
 
Pij: Value standardizing valuation xij on the closed section [0, 1] by attributes  
i=1, 2, …, m, j=1, 2, …, n 
Ej: Entropy value of regularization value Pij to attribute Cj, 0≤Ej≤1, j=1, 2, …, n 
dj: Diversity of the information offered by the valuation of attribute Cj,  
dj=1-Ej, j=1, 2, …, n 
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sj: Subjective weight set by a decision maker considering attribute 0≤sj≤1, j=1, 2, …, n 
wj: Regularized weight calculated by diversity dj, 0≤wj≤1, j=1, 2, …, n 
W*j: Each attribute’s weight of negotiation alternatives calculated by entropy measure 0≤Wj≤1 
αi: Sum of the product of multiplying Pij of Cj to Ai by W*j calculated by entropy measure i=1, 
2, … , m, j=1, 2, …, n  
k: Negotiation round   
δk: Negotiation penalty sustained by sellers in k round 
V: Utility function of the seller’s negotiation substitutes 
CF: Certainty of success of negotiation alternatives according to a price in k round through 
the analysis of the negotiation alternatives by the negotiation counterpart (buyer) 
E(αik): Worth of the negotiation plan in k round applying the buyer’s penalty for delayed 
negotiation  
U(αik): Utility of the negotiation plan applying utility function V to worth (E(αik)) of the 
negotiation plan in k round negotiation 
P(αij): Final worth of the negotiation plan considering the seller’s utility of negotiation 
alternatives as the negotiation characteristic of the buyer in k round negotiation  
 
Using the MADM method, the value of negotiation alternatives is calculated by the following 
formula: 
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When sellers make negotiation alternatives as shown in <Table 1>, the negotiation substitute is 
compared via the MADM method. 
Specifically, the attributes of the negotiation item need to be changed by the same standard using the 
entropy method to meet a valuation index, since the attributes, price, time limit for delivery, and 
quality have a different standard.  
First, standard regularization value pij needs to be calculated when using the entropy method.  
Calculating standard regularization value pij of xij after replacing the attributes shown in <Table 1> 
with formula (1) produces the value shown in (7). 
 
   (7) 
By solving matrix P using formulas (2), (3), (4), and (5), Ej, dj, wj, sj, and W*j  (<Table 2>) related 
to the price and time limit for delivery can be derived. 
 
<Table 2> The result of Calculated MADM 
Division C1 (price) C2 (time limit for delivery) C3 (quality) 
Ej 0.996306 0.996184 0.999054 
dj 0.003694 0.003816 0.000946 
wj 0.436859 0.451281 0.111860 
sj 0.4 0.3 0.3 
W*j 0.508440 0.393919 0.097641 
 
By replacing each attribute’s weight of negotiation alternatives W*j with formula (6), worth αi of each 
substitute can be derived. In <Table 3>, αi shows the result of worth valuation related to negotiation 
alternatives derived using formula (6). 
 
<Table 3> The results of value assessment on negotiation alternatives 
Value of 
Negotiation 
Substitutes 
Valuation Result 
of Negotiation 
Substitutes 
Value of 
Negotiation 
Substitutes 
Valuation Result 
of Negotiation 
Substitutes 
Value of 
Negotiation 
Substitutes 
Valuation Result 
of Negotiation 
Substitutes 
α1 0.048739  α9 0.049059  α17 0.045297  
α2 0.048699  α10 0.049020  α18 0.045257  
α3 0.048659  α11 0.048980  α19 0.045217  
α4 0.048620  α12 0.048941  α20 0.045178  
α5 0.048580  α13 0.048901  α21 0.045138  
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α6 0.048541  α14 0.048861    
α7 0.048501  α15 0.045376    
α8 0.049099  α16 0.045336    
 
The value of αi of negotiation alternatives related to negotiation alternativesA1 ? A21  as shown in 
<Table 3> is the valuation worth of the seller’s negotiation substitutes, serving as basic data for 
choosing a negotiation plan. In negotiation alternatives with excellent valuation worth, negotiation 
favors the sellers. Still, sellers and buyers need to find a common ground in the negotiation 
alternatives to reach an agreement in negotiation since buyers will also negotiate for their own interest. 
Chapter 4 presents a negotiation plan between buyers and sellers considering the penalty for delayed 
negotiation, certainty of success of the negotiation plan, and risk preference of the negotiation result. 
 
4. Multi attributes Automated negotiation Methodology 
An automated negotiation requires the automatic creation of alternatives, suggestion of measures, 
evaluation of a negotiating partner’s measure, and proposal of countermeasures for negotiation. This 
chapter introduces a method of automatic negotiation wherein the penalty for delayed negotiation, 
confidence for success, and negotiating types of buyers are applied to the negotiation alternatives 
discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
4.1 Classification of negotiating partners by risk preference 
A negotiation is composed of a series of proposals and counternegotiation measures that last until its 
conclusion or breakdown (Deutsch, 1973). The proposals made during negotiation may be classified 
by a few typical approaches. For instance, Thomas (1990) reported that competition, cooperation, 
compromise, alignment, and evasion are the approaches to general negotiations. Rahim (1983) 
approached negotiation from a more personal viewpoint and suggested the strategies of access, 
dominance, kindness, integration, compromise, and evasion. Fatima et al (2004) proposed a 
decision-making function in the forms of Conceder, Linear, and Boulware.  According to the theory, 
a decision maker proposes a planned price as the negotiation progresses. The study carried out by Lee, 
Jong-Geon et al (2004) showed the consequences and differences in the results of the negotiation 
strategies chosen by each negotiation participant by conducting experiments. Through the existing 
studies on negotiation strategies, the types of negotiation participants may be classified according to 
the benefits to be obtained through the successful resolution of negotiation and risk level of 
negotiation failure. In this study, the types of negotiation participants are divided into “risk lover,” 
“risk averter,” and “risk-neutral person.” 
The participant who prefers taking risks puts more weight on the values expected to be gained when 
the negotiation is successfully concluded than on the risk of breakdown and tends to force the 
negotiating partner to yield even though his/her demands are very likely to be rejected. This type of 
participant does not expose his/her last bargaining chip until the final moment of negotiation, 
remaining intractable to the end even if the partner concedes. On the other hand, a risk averter puts the 
risk of failure on the front burner rather than the benefits of success; hence the tendency to give in to 
the partner if only to avoid breakdown. In other words, this type of negotiator tries to make a 
concession ahead of its partner in order to increase the possibility of conclusion of the negotiation. 
Furthermore, he/she strives to obtain the consent of the partner even if it means resorting to disclosing 
his/her ultimatum at the initial stage of the negotiation. 
On the other hand, a risk-neutral person considers the benefits of agreement to be equal to the risk of 
breakdown. This type of negotiator makes concessions based on the possibility of failure in 
negotiation. In this study, the types of negotiators described above (risk lover, risk averter, 
risk-neutral person) are categorized into sellers and buyers. 
The utility function of negotiation participants can be divided into various types of functions 
according to their level of risk preference: exponential function, logarithmic function, linear function, 
quadratic function, etc. Formulas (8), (9), and (10) deal with utility function “V” of the risk-neutral 
person, risk lover, and risk averter. The formulas are made randomly in the forms of linear function or 
quadratic function according to each type of negotiator. 
! iV =    (8) 
!
2
i
V =   (9) 
( ) 11 2 +!!= " iV   (10) More specific utility functions can be determined when negotiators determine the value of a 
negotiation measure and its consequent utility. 
From the viewpoint of a seller as the focus of this study, the seller itself can obtain its utility function 
by inputting its utility values for itself; it does not know a buyer’s utility function, however. The seller 
can make the negotiation move forward, presuming the type of the buyer by extrapolating its track 
record on trade or the degree of concession it makes during negotiation. In the absence of preliminary 
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information, or if judging the buyer’s type is difficult while carrying out negotiation, the seller can 
assume the buyer to be a certain type of negotiator and speed up the progress of the talks. 
 
4.2 Generator of negotiation measures 
The flow chart below shows the process of generating negotiation measures (<Figure 2>). To create 
such measures, the information of the negotiator such as his/her negotiation measures and negotiating 
type and information of the seller including his/her alternative measures, risk preference, penalties for 
delay, and chance of success of the measure are inputted by the generator for negotiation measures, 
which in turn selects the best measure among the negotiation alternatives through the internal rules for 
generating negotiation measurers based on the inputted information and recommends the best 
alternative to the buyer. 
 
            <Figure 2> The progress of generating negotiation messages 
 
 
In this section, the penalties for delayed negotiation and probable success of a measure required to 
draw up a negotiation measure shall be examined. The process of formulating a negotiation measure 
by generator shall also be explained. 
 
4.2.1 Penalty for delayed negotiation 
A buyer and a seller strive to increase the chance of success in a deal by narrowing the gap between 
the different measures from each side over time. This process of eliminating the different stances step 
by step is both a required course to achieve success and an important characteristic of negotiation. 
Nonetheless, longer negotiating time results in a more disadvantageous position for both the buyer 
and seller in terms of the economical aspects. This is because the time for negotiation serves as a cost 
factor for the negotiator. For instance, as the talks bog down, the opportunity cost for the possible 
chance of success in the other deal and loss are incurred due to the non-operating facilities. Therefore, 
the utility of a negotiation measure decreases alongside the time of postponement even if the 
negotiation is likely to be concluded. Against this backdrop, this study reflects a negotiator’s 
economic loss owing to such delay by applying the penalty for delayed negotiation (“δ”). 
The value of the penalty for delayed negotiation (“δ”) may vary according to negotiating 
environments and conditions. Formula (11) determines negotiation alternative E(αik) wherein the 
penalty for delayed negotiation is considered by applying δ  to αik as the alternative of K round. 
<Table 4> shows the results of applying the penalty for delayed negotiation in accordance with 
Formula (11). 
 
( ) ( ) 11 !!"= k
ikikik
E #$$   (11) 
 
The values of round 1 in Table 4 are determined by standardizing the results of value assessment on 
a negotiation alternative of Table 3 into values ranging from 0 to 1. Such values do not reflect the 
penalty for delayed negotiation (“δ”). Penalty δ is applied starting from round 2, and the value of a 
negotiation alternative gradually decreases according to the application of delay penalties. 
 
 
<Table 4> The results of reflecting the penalty for delayed negotiation 
Negotiation Alternatives 
Round δ 
α21 α20 α19 α18 α17 α16 α15 α7 α6 α5 α4 α3 α2 α1 α14 α13 α12 α11 α10 α9 α8 
1 0 0.000  0.010  0.020  0.030  0.040  0.050  0.060  0.849  0.859  0.869  0.879  0.889  0.899  0.909  0.940  0.950  0.960  0.970  0.980  0.990  1.000  
2 0.05 0.000  0.009  0.019  0.028  0.038  0.047  0.057  0.807  0.816  0.826  0.835  0.845  0.854  0.864  0.893  0.903  0.912  0.922  0.931  0.941  0.950  
3 0.05 0.000  0.009  0.018  0.027  0.036  0.045  0.054  0.766  0.775  0.784  0.793  0.802  0.811  0.820  0.848  0.857  0.866  0.875  0.884  0.893  0.903  
4 0.05 0.000  0.009  0.017  0.026  0.034  0.043  0.051  0.728  0.736  0.745  0.754  0.762  0.771  0.779  0.806  0.815  0.823  0.832  0.840  0.849  0.857  
5 0.05 0.000  0.008  0.016  0.024  0.033  0.041  0.049  0.691  0.700  0.708  0.716  0.724  0.732  0.740  0.766  0.774  0.782  0.790  0.798  0.806  0.815  
6 0.05 0.000  0.008  0.015  0.023  0.031  0.039  0.046  0.657  0.665  0.672  0.680  0.688  0.696  0.703  0.727  0.735  0.743  0.751  0.758  0.766  0.774  
7 0.05 0.000  0.007  0.015  0.022  0.029  0.037  0.044  0.624  0.631  0.639  0.646  0.653  0.661  0.668  0.691  0.698  0.706  0.713  0.720  0.728  0.735  
8 0.05 0.000  0.007  0.014  0.021  0.028  0.035  0.042  0.593  0.600  0.607  0.614  0.621  0.628  0.635  0.656  0.663  0.670  0.677  0.684  0.691  0.698  
9 0.05 0.000  0.007  0.013  0.020  0.027  0.033  0.040  0.563  0.570  0.576  0.583  0.590  0.596  0.603  0.624  0.630  0.637  0.644  0.650  0.657  0.663  
10 0.05 0.000  0.006  0.013  0.019  0.025  0.032  0.038  0.535  0.541  0.548  0.554  0.560  0.567  0.573  0.592  0.599  0.605  0.611  0.618  0.624  0.630  
11 0.05 0.000  0.006  0.012  0.018  0.024  0.030  0.036  0.508  0.514  0.520  0.526  0.532  0.538  0.544  0.563  0.569  0.575  0.581  0.587  0.593  0.599  
12 0.05 0.000  0.006  0.011  0.017  0.023  0.028  0.034  0.483  0.489  0.494  0.500  0.506  0.511  0.517  0.535  0.540  0.546  0.552  0.557  0.563  0.569  
13 0.05 0.000  0.005  0.011  0.016  0.022  0.027  0.032  0.459  0.464  0.470  0.475  0.480  0.486  0.491  0.508  0.513  0.519  0.524  0.530  0.535  0.540  
14 0.05 0.000  0.005  0.010  0.015  0.021  0.026  0.031  0.436  0.441  0.446  0.451  0.456  0.461  0.467  0.483  0.488  0.493  0.498  0.503  0.508  0.513  
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15 0.05 0.000  0.005  0.010  0.015  0.020  0.024  0.029  0.414  0.419  0.424  0.429  0.434  0.438  0.443  0.458  0.463  0.468  0.473  0.478  0.483  0.488  
 
In Table 4, the same negotiation penalty (0.05) is applied to each round. Depending on the internal 
or external conditions of the negotiation, however, the penalty may be applied differently. The 
negotiation penalty determined in the method described above is applied to the utility function of the 
negotiator in order to obtain the seller’s utility value for a negotiation alternative. The penalty also 
affects the certainty of success of the negotiation alternative (to be explained in the following section) 
as well as the selection of the final negotiation measure. 
 
4.2.2 Certainty factor of a negotiation alternative 
A negotiation participant proposes a bargaining measure to his/her negotiation partner, taking into 
account which measure would satisfy the partner.  A proposed negotiating measure that goes beyond 
the mark stands almost no chance of success in the negotiation. On the other hand, when the 
negotiator proposes a measure whose value is akin to that of the partner, the possibility of success in 
the negotiation increases.  
In addition, a negotiation participant tries to avoid prolonged delay in negotiation since it incurs 
consequential loss. Therefore, a negotiator should select the best strategy by factoring in the 
reasonable benefits and chance of success of a negotiation measure. There are several methods of 
analyzing the possibility of success for negotiation alternatives, including negotiation analysis with 
scant information of the game theory, Bayesian probabilistic model, and certainty. In this study, the 
method of certainty is employed to analyze the possibility of success. 
The advantage of such certainty method is that success analysis can be conducted in a relatively easy 
manner using simple concepts such as the level of certainty and uncertainty (Shortliffe et al, 1975), 
unlike the abovementioned methods such as the game theory or probabilistic theory with many 
hurdles hindering their actual application such as complicated calculations, cumbersome estimation 
work for probabilistic values, requirement of satisfying the probabilistic axiom, etc. 
Indicating the degree of confirmation, certainty is explained by the difference of belief and disbelief 
(Jae-Gyu Lee et al, 1996). 
 
CF(H, E) = MB(H, E) - MD(H, E) (12) 
 
Here, CF denotes the degree of confirmation of hypothesis (H) with given evidence (E), and MB, the 
measure of increased belief of H due to E. Finally, MD refers to the measure of increased disbelief of 
H due to E. 
In this study, certainty factor (CF) is determined by deducting the uncertainty from the certainty of a 
specific negotiation alternative. Specifically, the value of CF varies since the certainty and uncertainty 
assigned to each negotiation alternative at the beginning of the negotiation increase or decrease over 
time. 
Table 5 shows the degree of confirmation of each negotiation alternative at the start of negotiation. 
 
<Table 5> The degree of confirmation for a negotiation alternative 
Category α21 α20 α19 α18 α17 α16 α15 α7 α6 α5 α4 α3 α2 α1 α14 α13 α12 α11 α10 α9 α8 
MB 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  
MD 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.000  0.00  0.000  0.00  0.000  0.00  0.000  0.00  0.000  0.00  0.000  0.00  0.000  0.00  0.000  0.00  0.000  0.00  1st round 
CF 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  
 
As shown in the table above, the negotiation alternative with large value “α” comes first. Negotiation 
alternative “A8” with the highest value for the seller is placed at the rightmost side, and “A21” with the 
lowest value, at the leftmost side. 
The degree of certainty (MB) of the seller for each negotiation alternative is 1 throughout round 1. 
Simply put, all alternatives are believed to succeed at the beginning of a negotiation. On the other 
hand, since a buyer did not reject any alternative yet, the degree of uncertainty (MD) is “0.” 
Therefore, all alternatives have a maximum value of 1 in terms of the degree of certainty (CF) of the 
seller at the start of a negotiation. Still, such initial certainty changes as the negotiation progresses, 
due largely to the type of buyer and rejected negotiation measures. 
 
<Table 6> The changing degree of confirmation for a negotiation alternative 
Category α21 α20 α19 α18 α17 α16 α15 α7 α6 α5 α4 α3 α2 α1 α14 α13 α12 α11 α10 α9 α8 
MB 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.95  
MD 0 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.150  0.150  0.150  0.175  0.175  0.181  0.181  0.188  0.191  0.192  0.193  0.193  0.193  0.193  2nd round 
CF 1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  0.900  0.900  0.900  0.850  0.850  0.850  0.825  0.825  0.819  0.819  0.813  0.809  0.808  0.807  0.807  0.807  0.757  
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Table 6 shows the changed values of CF as a result of negotiation in round 1. CF is changed when 
the buyer rejects the seller’s proposal “α8.” 
Since the seller’s α8 alternative is rejected by the buyer, the MBs of α8 alternative and negotiation 
alternative (with value higher than α8) at the right side of the seller decrease, whereas the MDs of 
alternatives at the right side focusing on the α18  alternative offered by the buyer increase. 
As an alternative gets further from alternative α18, the range of MD expands. CF is calculated based 
on the decreased MB and increased MD, and CF serves as an important variable in the selection of the 
next negotiation measure.  
 
4.2.3 Generation of a negotiation measure 
 
A seller obtains “U(αik)” as the utility value of a negotiation alternative by substituting E(α ik), which 
is determined by applying the penalty for delay to a negotiation alternative, with V as the seller’s 
utility function. 
 
( ) ( )( )
ikik
EVU !! =    (13) 
 
Tables 7, 8, and 9 show the utility values determined by substituting E(αik) wherein the penalty for 
delay is considered for V as the utility function of the seller. In other words, these tables indicate the 
utility values of alternatives according to each type of seller. 
 
<Table 7> Utility value of Risk Lover on negotiation time 
Utility Value of Negotiation Alternatives (Risk Lover) 
Round 
U(α21) U(α20) U(α19) U(α18) U(α17) U(α16) U(α15) U(α7) U(α6) U(α5) U(α4) U(α3) U(α2) U(α1) U(α14) U(α13) U(α12) U(α11) U(α10) U(α9) U(α8) 
1 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.002  0.002  0.004  0.721  0.738  0.755  0.773  0.790  0.808  0.826  0.884  0.903  0.922  0.941  0.960  0.980  1.000  
2 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.003  0.650  0.666  0.681  0.697  0.713  0.729  0.746  0.797  0.815  0.832  0.849  0.867  0.885  0.903  
3 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.003  0.587  0.601  0.615  0.629  0.644  0.658  0.673  0.720  0.735  0.751  0.766  0.782  0.798  0.815  
4 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.003  0.530  0.542  0.555  0.568  0.581  0.594  0.607  0.650  0.663  0.677  0.692  0.706  0.720  0.735  
5 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.002  0.478  0.490  0.501  0.513  0.524  0.536  0.548  0.586  0.599  0.611  0.624  0.637  0.650  0.663  
6 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.432  0.442  0.452  0.463  0.473  0.484  0.495  0.529  0.540  0.552  0.563  0.575  0.587  0.599  
7 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.389  0.399  0.408  0.417  0.427  0.437  0.446  0.477  0.488  0.498  0.508  0.519  0.530  0.540  
8 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.351  0.360  0.368  0.377  0.385  0.394  0.403  0.431  0.440  0.449  0.459  0.468  0.478  0.488  
9 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.317  0.325  0.332  0.340  0.348  0.356  0.364  0.389  0.397  0.406  0.414  0.423  0.431  0.440  
10 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.286  0.293  0.300  0.307  0.314  0.321  0.328  0.351  0.358  0.366  0.374  0.381  0.389  0.397  
11 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.258  0.265  0.271  0.277  0.283  0.290  0.296  0.317  0.324  0.330  0.337  0.344  0.351  0.358  
12 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.233  0.239  0.244  0.250  0.256  0.261  0.267  0.286  0.292  0.298  0.304  0.311  0.317  0.324  
13 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.210  0.215  0.220  0.226  0.231  0.236  0.241  0.258  0.264  0.269  0.275  0.280  0.286  0.292  
14 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.190  0.194  0.199  0.204  0.208  0.213  0.218  0.233  0.238  0.243  0.248  0.253  0.258  0.264  
15 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.171  0.175  0.180  0.184  0.188  0.192  0.197  0.210  0.215  0.219  0.224  0.228  0.233  0.238  
 
<Table 8> Utility value of Risk-Neutral Person on negotiation time 
Utility Value of Negotiation Alternatives (Risk-Neutral Person) 
Round 
U(α21) U(α20) U(α19) U(α18) U(α17) U(α16) U(α15) U(α7) U(α6) U(α5) U(α4) U(α3) U(α2) U(α1) U(α14) U(α13) U(α12) U(α11) U(α10) U(α9) U(α8) 
1 0.000  0.010  0.020  0.030  0.040  0.050  0.060  0.849  0.859  0.869  0.879  0.889  0.899  0.909  0.940  0.950  0.960  0.970  0.980  0.990  1.000  
2 0.000  0.009  0.019  0.028  0.038  0.047  0.057  0.807  0.816  0.826  0.835  0.845  0.854  0.864  0.893  0.903  0.912  0.922  0.931  0.941  0.950  
3 0.000  0.009  0.018  0.027  0.036  0.045  0.054  0.766  0.775  0.784  0.793  0.802  0.811  0.820  0.848  0.857  0.866  0.875  0.884  0.893  0.903  
4 0.000  0.009  0.017  0.026  0.034  0.043  0.051  0.728  0.736  0.745  0.754  0.762  0.771  0.779  0.806  0.815  0.823  0.832  0.840  0.849  0.857  
5 0.000  0.008  0.016  0.024  0.033  0.041  0.049  0.691  0.700  0.708  0.716  0.724  0.732  0.740  0.766  0.774  0.782  0.790  0.798  0.806  0.815  
6 0.000  0.008  0.015  0.023  0.031  0.039  0.046  0.657  0.665  0.672  0.680  0.688  0.696  0.703  0.727  0.735  0.743  0.751  0.758  0.766  0.774  
7 0.000  0.007  0.015  0.022  0.029  0.037  0.044  0.624  0.631  0.639  0.646  0.653  0.661  0.668  0.691  0.698  0.706  0.713  0.720  0.728  0.735  
8 0.000  0.007  0.014  0.021  0.028  0.035  0.042  0.593  0.600  0.607  0.614  0.621  0.628  0.635  0.656  0.663  0.670  0.677  0.684  0.691  0.698  
9 0.000  0.007  0.013  0.020  0.027  0.033  0.040  0.563  0.570  0.576  0.583  0.590  0.596  0.603  0.624  0.630  0.637  0.644  0.650  0.657  0.663  
10 0.000  0.006  0.013  0.019  0.025  0.032  0.038  0.535  0.541  0.548  0.554  0.560  0.567  0.573  0.592  0.599  0.605  0.611  0.618  0.624  0.630  
11 0.000  0.006  0.012  0.018  0.024  0.030  0.036  0.508  0.514  0.520  0.526  0.532  0.538  0.544  0.563  0.569  0.575  0.581  0.587  0.593  0.599  
12 0.000  0.006  0.011  0.017  0.023  0.028  0.034  0.483  0.489  0.494  0.500  0.506  0.511  0.517  0.535  0.540  0.546  0.552  0.557  0.563  0.569  
13 0.000  0.005  0.011  0.016  0.022  0.027  0.032  0.459  0.464  0.470  0.475  0.480  0.486  0.491  0.508  0.513  0.519  0.524  0.530  0.535  0.540  
14 0.000  0.005  0.010  0.015  0.021  0.026  0.031  0.436  0.441  0.446  0.451  0.456  0.461  0.467  0.483  0.488  0.493  0.498  0.503  0.508  0.513  
15 0.000  0.005  0.010  0.015  0.020  0.024  0.029  0.414  0.419  0.424  0.429  0.434  0.438  0.443  0.458  0.463  0.468  0.473  0.478  0.483  0.488  
 
<Table 9> Utility value of Risk Averter on negotiation time 
Round Utility Value of Negotiation Alternatives (Risk Averter) 
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Round U(α21) U(α20) U(α19) U(α18) U(α17) U(α16) U(α15) U(α7) U(α6) U(α5) U(α4) U(α3) U(α2) U(α1) U(α14) U(α13) U(α12) U(α11) U(α10) U(α9) U(α8) 
1 0.000  0.020  0.040  0.059  0.078  0.097  0.116  0.977  0.980  0.983  0.985  0.988  0.990  0.992  0.996  0.998  0.998  0.999  1.000  1.000  1.000  
2 0.000  0.019  0.038  0.056  0.075  0.093  0.111  0.963  0.966  0.970  0.973  0.976  0.979  0.981  0.989  0.990  0.992  0.994  0.995  0.996  0.998  
3 0.000  0.018  0.036  0.053  0.071  0.088  0.105  0.945  0.949  0.953  0.957  0.961  0.964  0.968  0.977  0.980  0.982  0.984  0.987  0.989  0.990  
4 0.000  0.017  0.034  0.051  0.067  0.084  0.100  0.926  0.931  0.935  0.939  0.943  0.947  0.951  0.962  0.966  0.969  0.972  0.974  0.977  0.980  
5 0.000  0.016  0.032  0.048  0.064  0.080  0.095  0.905  0.910  0.915  0.919  0.924  0.928  0.933  0.945  0.949  0.952  0.956  0.959  0.963  0.966  
6 0.000  0.015  0.031  0.046  0.061  0.076  0.091  0.882  0.888  0.893  0.898  0.903  0.907  0.912  0.926  0.930  0.934  0.938  0.942  0.945  0.949  
7 0.000  0.015  0.029  0.044  0.058  0.072  0.086  0.859  0.864  0.870  0.875  0.880  0.885  0.890  0.905  0.909  0.913  0.918  0.922  0.926  0.930  
8 0.000  0.014  0.028  0.041  0.055  0.069  0.082  0.834  0.840  0.845  0.851  0.856  0.861  0.867  0.882  0.887  0.891  0.896  0.900  0.905  0.909  
9 0.000  0.013  0.026  0.039  0.052  0.065  0.078  0.809  0.815  0.821  0.826  0.832  0.837  0.842  0.858  0.863  0.868  0.873  0.878  0.882  0.887  
10 0.000  0.013  0.025  0.037  0.050  0.062  0.074  0.784  0.790  0.795  0.801  0.807  0.812  0.818  0.834  0.839  0.844  0.849  0.854  0.859  0.863  
11 0.000  0.012  0.024  0.036  0.047  0.059  0.071  0.758  0.764  0.770  0.776  0.781  0.787  0.792  0.809  0.814  0.819  0.824  0.829  0.834  0.839  
12 0.000  0.011  0.023  0.034  0.045  0.056  0.067  0.733  0.738  0.744  0.750  0.756  0.761  0.767  0.783  0.789  0.794  0.799  0.804  0.809  0.814  
13 0.000  0.011  0.021  0.032  0.043  0.053  0.064  0.707  0.713  0.719  0.724  0.730  0.736  0.741  0.758  0.763  0.768  0.774  0.779  0.784  0.789  
14 0.000  0.010  0.020  0.031  0.041  0.051  0.061  0.682  0.687  0.693  0.699  0.704  0.710  0.716  0.732  0.738  0.743  0.748  0.753  0.758  0.763  
15 0.000  0.010  0.019  0.029  0.039  0.048  0.058  0.657  0.662  0.668  0.674  0.679  0.685  0.690  0.707  0.712  0.717  0.722  0.727  0.733  0.738  
 
These are the utility values according to each type of seller. These results are gained by substituting 
a seller’s utility function with equation 24, which is used to calculate the utility values of negotiation 
alternatives. 
The seller applies CF to the utility value according to his/her risk preference type and selects the best 
alternative in each round to propose it to the buyer. 
In case the buyer rejects the alternative and comes up with another alternative, the seller adjusts CF 
in the next round of negotiation and chooses the best alternative as a negotiating measure. 
Using the utility value by each type of seller and CF of a negotiating measure considering the 
alternative offered by the buyer and obtained in the method described above automatically leads to 
selecting the optimum alternative to be proposed. 
 
4.2.4 Negotiation experiment and results 
This section takes a closer look at how a buyer and a seller actually carry out negotiation considering 
the utility value of a negotiation alternative as determined in the previous section plus the CF of a 
negotiation alternative that changes according to the negotiating measures proposed by the buyer and 
which kinds of negotiation measures help the buyer and the seller reach an agreement. 
A seller can calculate final value P(α ik) of a negotiating alternative by multiplying U(α ik) as the 
utility value of a negotiation alternative determined by negotiator type as described above by CF as 
the chance of success of an alternative. Calculating the value of P(α ik) uses the same equation as 
Equation 25. 
 
( ) ( )CFUP
ikik
!= ""    (14) 
 
Table 10 presents the process of negotiation of a risk-neutral seller and a risk averter. The final 
utility value of P( α ik) changes as the CF of the seller varies according to the buyer’s response. The 
seller selects the negotiation alternative with the highest value of P(α ik) and makes the corresponding 
suggestion in each negotiation round. In this experiment, a seller’s negotiating measure is assumed to 
be generated in conformity with the seller’s own generation rules for negotiation measures. The 
process of selecting a negotiating measure is then applied randomly based on each buyer’s type. 
 
<Table 10> The process of negotiation of a risk-neutral seller and a risk-averting buyer 
Round P(α21) P(α20) P(α19) P(α18) P(α17) P(α16) P(α15) P(α7) P(α6) P(α5) P(α4) P(α3) P(α2) P(α1) P(α14) P(α13) P(α12) P(α11) P(α10) P(α9) P(α8) 
1 0.0000  0.0100  0.0200  0.0300  0.0400  0.0500  0.0600  0.8490  0.8590  0.8690  0.8790  0.8890  0.8990  0.9090  0.9400  0.9500  0.9600  0.9700  0.9800  0.9900  1.0000  
2 0.0000  0.0095  0.0171  0.0256  0.0342  0.0404  0.0484  0.6856  0.6732  0.6811  0.6889  0.6915  0.6992  0.7016  0.7256  0.7305  0.7368  0.7438  0.7511  0.7588  0.7189  
3 0.0000  0.0090  0.0180  0.0271  0.0325  0.0406  0.0487  0.6513  0.6589  0.6666  0.6545  0.6619  0.6643  0.6717  0.6893  0.6939  0.7000  0.7066  0.7135  0.6761  0.6379  
4 0.0000  0.0086  0.0171  0.0257  0.0343  0.0429  0.0463  0.6551  0.6628  0.6333  0.6406  0.6288  0.6359  0.6381  0.6599  0.6618  0.6662  0.6719  0.6362  0.5999  0.5631  
5 0.0000  0.0081  0.0163  0.0244  0.0326  0.0407  0.0489  0.6223  0.6297  0.6016  0.6085  0.5974  0.6041  0.6062  0.6269  0.6287  0.6329  0.5988  0.5644  0.5296  0.4942  
6 0.0000  0.0077  0.0155  0.0232  0.0309  0.0348  0.0464  0.6569  0.5982  0.6052  0.6121  0.5847  0.5913  0.5803  0.6001  0.6019  0.5664  0.5324  0.4989  0.4651  0.4308  
7 0.0000  0.0074  0.0147  0.0221  0.0294  0.0368  0.0441  0.6241  0.6314  0.5749  0.5815  0.5555  0.5617  0.5512  0.5701  0.5368  0.5028  0.4702  0.4379  0.4054  0.3725  
 
As shown in Table 10, the buyer proposed negotiating measures P(α21) to P(α6) from the left side 
from round 1 to 7. On the other hand, the seller suggested measures P(α8) to P(α6). After rejecting the 
negotiating measures proposed by the seller from round 1 to 6, the buyer made a concession over 
his/her measures to the seller considering those of the seller. 
735 
On the part of the seller, he/she also gave in to the demand of the buyer in each round considering 
the penalties and change in CF. As a result, the gap between the measures of the two parties narrowed, 
finally concluding the negotiation in round 7 with measure P(α 6). 
Tables 11 and 12 show the negotiation process of a risk-neutral seller and a buyer as well as of a 
risk-neutral seller and a risk-loving buyer, respectively. 
 
<Table 11> The process of negotiation of a risk-neutral seller and a risk-neutral buyer 
Round P(α21) P(α20) P(α19) P(α18) P(α17) P(α16) P(α15) P(α7) P(α6) P(α5) P(α4) P(α3) P(α2) P(α1) P(α14) P(α13) P(α12) P(α11) P(α10) P(α9) P(α8) 
1 0.0000  0.0100  0.0200  0.0300  0.0400  0.0500  0.0600  0.8490  0.8590  0.8690  0.8790  0.8890  0.8990  0.9090  0.9400  0.9500  0.9600  0.9700  0.9800  0.9900  1.0000  
2 0.0000  0.0095  0.0171  0.0256  0.0342  0.0404  0.0484  0.6856  0.6732  0.6811  0.6889  0.6915  0.6992  0.7016  0.7256  0.7305  0.7368  0.7438  0.7511  0.7588  0.7379  
3 0.0000  0.0090  0.0162  0.0244  0.0325  0.0406  0.0460  0.6513  0.6589  0.6470  0.6545  0.6569  0.6643  0.6665  0.6893  0.6939  0.7000  0.7066  0.7135  0.6940  0.6740  
4 0.0000  0.0086  0.0171  0.0231  0.0309  0.0386  0.0463  0.6187  0.6260  0.6333  0.6217  0.6288  0.6311  0.6381  0.6548  0.6618  0.6662  0.6719  0.6530  0.6339  0.6145  
5 0.0000  0.0081  0.0163  0.0244  0.0293  0.0367  0.0440  0.5878  0.5947  0.6016  0.5906  0.5974  0.5995  0.6062  0.6221  0.6263  0.6317  0.6140  0.5961  0.5780  0.5594  
6 0.0000  0.0077  0.0155  0.0232  0.0309  0.0348  0.0418  0.5912  0.5650  0.5715  0.5781  0.5675  0.5739  0.5759  0.5955  0.5973  0.5789  0.5613  0.5438  0.5261  0.5082  
7 0.0000  0.0074  0.0147  0.0221  0.0294  0.0368  0.0397  0.5617  0.5683  0.5430  0.5492  0.5391  0.5452  0.5471  0.5657  0.5465  0.5288  0.5119  0.4950  0.4780  0.4607  
8 0.0000  0.0070  0.0140  0.0209  0.0279  0.0349  0.0419  0.5336  0.5219  0.4794  0.4665  0.4377  0.4238  0.4055  0.3996  0.3798  0.3616  0.3440  0.3265  0.3089  0.2910  
 
<Table 12> The process of negotiation of a risk-neutral seller and a risk-loving buyer 
Round P(α21) P(α20) P(α19) P(α18) P(α17) P(α16) P(α15) P(α7) P(α6) P(α5) P(α4) P(α3) P(α2) P(α1) P(α14) P(α13) P(α12) P(α11) P(α10) P(α9) P(α8) 
1 0.0000  0.0100  0.0200  0.0300  0.0400  0.0500  0.0600  0.8490  0.8590  0.8690  0.8790  0.8890  0.8990  0.9090  0.9400  0.9500  0.9600  0.9700  0.9800  0.9900  1.0000  
2 0.0000  0.0085  0.0171  0.0256  0.0342  0.0404  0.0484  0.6856  0.6732  0.6811  0.6889  0.6915  0.6992  0.7016  0.7256  0.7305  0.7368  0.7438  0.7511  0.7588  0.7474  
3 0.0000  0.0081  0.0162  0.0244  0.0325  0.0384  0.0460  0.6513  0.6396  0.6470  0.6545  0.6569  0.6643  0.6665  0.6893  0.6939  0.7000  0.7066  0.7135  0.7030  0.6920  
4 0.0000  0.0077  0.0154  0.0231  0.0309  0.0364  0.0437  0.6187  0.6076  0.6147  0.6217  0.6240  0.6311  0.6332  0.6548  0.6592  0.6650  0.6713  0.6611  0.6508  0.6403  
5 0.0000  0.0073  0.0147  0.0220  0.0293  0.0346  0.0415  0.5878  0.5772  0.5839  0.5906  0.5928  0.5995  0.6015  0.6221  0.6263  0.6317  0.6219  0.6120  0.6022  0.5920  
6 0.0000  0.0077  0.0139  0.0209  0.0279  0.0348  0.0395  0.5584  0.5650  0.5547  0.5611  0.5632  0.5695  0.5715  0.5910  0.5950  0.5853  0.5758  0.5663  0.5567  0.5469  
7 0.0000  0.0074  0.0132  0.0198  0.0265  0.0331  0.0375  0.5305  0.5367  0.5270  0.5331  0.5350  0.5411  0.5429  0.5614  0.5513  0.5419  0.5327  0.5236  0.5143  0.5048  
8 0.0000  0.0070  0.0126  0.0189  0.0251  0.0314  0.0356  0.5039  0.5099  0.5006  0.5064  0.5083  0.5140  0.5158  0.5202  0.5104  0.5014  0.4926  0.4837  0.4748  0.4656  
9 0.0000  0.0066  0.0133  0.0179  0.0239  0.0299  0.0358  0.4787  0.4844  0.4900  0.4811  0.4866  0.4883  0.4937  0.4817  0.4723  0.4636  0.4551  0.4465  0.4379  0.4291  
10 0.0000  0.0063  0.0126  0.0170  0.0227  0.0284  0.0340  0.4548  0.4602  0.4655  0.4570  0.4622  0.4639  0.4576  0.4458  0.4367  0.4283  0.4201  0.4118  0.4035  0.3950  
11 0.0000  0.0060  0.0120  0.0180  0.0216  0.0269  0.0323  0.4321  0.4372  0.4422  0.4342  0.4391  0.4299  0.4238  0.4123  0.4035  0.3954  0.3875  0.3795  0.3715  0.3633  
12 0.0000  0.0057  0.0114  0.0171  0.0228  0.0256  0.0307  0.4346  0.4055  0.4004  0.3950  0.3767  0.3707  0.3613  0.3629  0.3509  0.3429  0.3350  0.3271  0.3192  0.3110  
13 0.0000  0.0054  0.0108  0.0162  0.0216  0.0270  0.0324  0.4129  0.3992  0.3944  0.3657  0.3603  0.3425  0.3365  0.3346  0.3247  0.3161  0.3081  0.3003  0.2925  0.2846  
 
Table 13 shows the negotiation process of a risk-averting seller. 
 
<Table 13> The process of negotiation of a risk-averting seller and a risk-averting buyer 
Round P(α21) P(α20) P(α19) P(α18) P(α17) P(α16) P(α15) P(α7) P(α6) P(α5) P(α4) P(α3) P(α2) P(α1) P(α14) P(α13) P(α12) P(α11) P(α10) P(α9) P(α8) 
1 0.0000  0.0199  0.0396  0.0591  0.0784  0.0975  0.1164  0.9772  0.9801  0.9828  0.9854  0.9877  0.9898  0.9917  0.9964  0.9975  0.9984  0.9991  0.9996  0.9999  1.0000  
2 0.0000  0.0170  0.0339  0.0506  0.0671  0.0788  0.0941  0.8182  0.7971  0.7999  0.8025  0.7990  0.8013  0.7974  0.8032  0.8017  0.8016  0.8022  0.8029  0.8039  0.7549  
3 0.0000  0.0180  0.0358  0.0534  0.0638  0.0794  0.0948  0.8035  0.8071  0.8104  0.7897  0.7928  0.7896  0.7923  0.7938  0.7929  0.7935  0.7946  0.7960  0.7482  0.7000  
4 0.0000  0.0171  0.0340  0.0508  0.0674  0.0839  0.0902  0.8334  0.8375  0.7947  0.7984  0.7783  0.7816  0.7789  0.7879  0.7845  0.7840  0.7850  0.7378  0.6906  0.6434  
5 0.0000  0.0162  0.0323  0.0483  0.0641  0.0798  0.0953  0.8143  0.8188  0.7774  0.7814  0.7622  0.7658  0.7636  0.7738  0.7709  0.7709  0.7245  0.6783  0.6321  0.5859  
6 0.0000  0.0154  0.0307  0.0459  0.0609  0.0683  0.0907  0.8823  0.7988  0.7588  0.7181  0.6318  0.5898  0.5244  0.4860  0.4359  0.3852  0.3370  0.2899  0.2431  0.1962  
 
The negotiation process of a risk-averting seller and a buyer clearly shows that the buyer proposed 
negotiation measures P( α 21) to P(α7) at the left side, and the seller, measures P( α 8) to P( α 7) at the 
right side. 
 Despite turning down the measure proposed by the seller in rounds 1~5, the buyer also made a 
concession to the seller’s demand. In addition, the seller gradually took a step backward from his/her 
initial stance, factoring in the penalty for delay, change in CF, and other factors. In round 5, the seller 
made a significant concession, thereby leading to the conclusion of the negotiation in round 6 with 
measure P( α 7). 
Tables 14 and 15 show the negotiation process of a risk-averting seller and a risk-neutral buyer as 
well as of a risk-averting seller and a risk-loving buyer, respectively. 
 
<Table 14> The process of negotiation of a risk-averting seller and a risk-neutral buyer 
 P(α21) P(α20) P(α19) P(α18) P(α17) P(α16) P(α15) P(α7) P(α6) P(α5) P(α4) P(α3) P(α2) P(α1) P(α14) P(α13) P(α12) P(α11) P(α10) P(α9) P(α8) 
Round 1 0.0000  0.0199  0.0396  0.0591  0.0784  0.0975  0.1164  0.9772  0.9801  0.9828  0.9854  0.9877  0.9898  0.9917  0.9964  0.9975  0.9984  0.9991  0.9996  0.9999  1.0000  
Round 2 0.0000  0.0170  0.0339  0.0506  0.0671  0.0788  0.0941  0.8182  0.7971  0.7999  0.8025  0.7990  0.8013  0.7974  0.8032  0.8017  0.8016  0.8022  0.8029  0.8039  0.7748  
Round 3 0.0000  0.0180  0.0322  0.0481  0.0638  0.0794  0.0896  0.8035  0.8071  0.7866  0.7897  0.7867  0.7896  0.7863  0.7938  0.7929  0.7935  0.7946  0.7960  0.7679  0.7397  
Round 4 0.0000  0.0171  0.0340  0.0457  0.0607  0.0755  0.0902  0.7871  0.7631  0.7386  0.6904  0.6651  0.6336  0.6076  0.5798  0.5528  0.5225  0.4935  0.4650  0.4365  0.4083  
736 
Round 5 0.0000  0.0162  0.0323  0.0483  0.0577  0.0718  0.0858  0.7420  0.7187  0.6951  0.6481  0.6236  0.5929  0.5677  0.5411  0.5118  0.4837  0.4561  0.4286  0.4011  0.3735  
Round 6 0.0000  0.0154  0.0307  0.0459  0.0609  0.0683  0.0816  0.7411  0.6745  0.6517  0.6284  0.5822  0.5580  0.5278  0.5080  0.4765  0.4477  0.4200  0.3928  0.3656  0.3385  
Round 7 0.0000  0.0146  0.0292  0.0436  0.0579  0.0722  0.0776  0.6955  0.6740  0.6087  0.5861  0.5412  0.5177  0.4883  0.4692  0.4386  0.4105  0.3835  0.3569  0.3303  0.3038  
Round 8 0.0000  0.0139  0.0277  0.0415  0.0551  0.0686  0.0820  0.6507  0.6299  0.5664  0.5446  0.5009  0.4781  0.4496  0.4311  0.4012  0.3738  0.3475  0.3216  0.2956  0.2698  
 
<Table 15> The process of negotiation of a risk-averting seller and a risk-loving buyer 
 P(α21) P(α20) P(α19) P(α18) P(α17) P(α16) P(α15) P(α7) P(α6) P(α5) P(α4) P(α3) P(α2) P(α1) P(α14) P(α13) P(α12) P(α11) P(α10) P(α9) P(α8) 
Round 1 0.0000  0.0199  0.0396  0.0591  0.0784  0.0975  0.1164  0.9772  0.9801  0.9828  0.9854  0.9877  0.9898  0.9917  0.9964  0.9975  0.9984  0.9991  0.9996  0.9999  1.0000  
Round 2 0.0000  0.0170  0.0339  0.0506  0.0671  0.0788  0.0941  0.8182  0.7971  0.7999  0.8025  0.7990  0.8013  0.7974  0.8032  0.8017  0.8016  0.8022  0.8029  0.8039  0.7848  
Round 3 0.0000  0.0162  0.0322  0.0481  0.0638  0.0750  0.0896  0.8035  0.7833  0.7866  0.7897  0.7867  0.7896  0.7863  0.7938  0.7929  0.7935  0.7946  0.7960  0.7778  0.7595  
Round 4 0.0000  0.0154  0.0306  0.0457  0.0607  0.0713  0.0852  0.7871  0.7677  0.7714  0.7749  0.7724  0.7757  0.7729  0.7819  0.7815  0.7826  0.7843  0.7667  0.7492  0.7316  
Round 5 0.0000  0.0146  0.0291  0.0434  0.0577  0.0678  0.0810  0.7691  0.7506  0.7546  0.7584  0.7564  0.7600  0.7577  0.7679  0.7680  0.7695  0.7524  0.7355  0.7188  0.7018  
Round 6 0.0000  0.0154  0.0276  0.0413  0.0548  0.0683  0.0771  0.7500  0.7544  0.7365  0.7406  0.7390  0.7429  0.7410  0.7521  0.7526  0.7358  0.7194  0.7031  0.6870  0.6706  
Round 7 0.0000  0.0146  0.0263  0.0393  0.0521  0.0649  0.0733  0.7299  0.7172  0.6826  0.6692  0.6500  0.6361  0.6163  0.6083  0.5903  0.5735  0.5571  0.5409  0.5247  0.5084  
Round 8 0.0000  0.0139  0.0250  0.0373  0.0496  0.0617  0.0697  0.6924  0.6803  0.6467  0.6339  0.6154  0.6019  0.5828  0.5755  0.5581  0.5418  0.5260  0.5103  0.4947  0.4788  
Round 9 0.0000  0.0132  0.0264  0.0355  0.0471  0.0587  0.0702  0.6555  0.6438  0.6319  0.5990  0.5864  0.5682  0.5549  0.5429  0.5261  0.5104  0.4951  0.4798  0.4647  0.4494  
Round10 0.0000  0.0126  0.0250  0.0337  0.0448  0.0558  0.0668  0.6192  0.6080  0.5965  0.5647  0.5526  0.5350  0.5222  0.5108  0.4945  0.4793  0.4645  0.4498  0.4351  0.4202  
Round11 0.0000  0.0119  0.0238  0.0356  0.0426  0.0531  0.0635  0.5838  0.5731  0.5620  0.5313  0.5195  0.5026  0.4902  0.4793  0.4635  0.4488  0.4345  0.4202  0.4060  0.3916  
Round12 0.0000  0.0113  0.0226  0.0338  0.0450  0.0505  0.0604  0.5861  0.5391  0.5284  0.5175  0.4874  0.4758  0.4591  0.4534  0.4333  0.4191  0.4052  0.3914  0.3777  0.3637  
Round13 0.0000  0.0108  0.0215  0.0322  0.0428  0.0533  0.0638  0.5515  0.5418  0.5318  0.4853  0.4745  0.4450  0.4335  0.4235  0.4064  0.3914  0.3774  0.3637  0.3501  0.3366  
 
Table 16 shows the negotiation process of a risk-loving seller and a risk-averting buyer. 
 
 
 
<Table 16> The process of negotiation of a risk-loving seller and a risk-averting buyer 
 P(α21) P(α20) P(α19) P(α18) P(α17) P(α16) P(α15) P(α7) P(α6) P(α5) P(α4) P(α3) P(α2) P(α1) P(α14) P(α13) P(α12) P(α11) P(α10) P(α9) P(α8) 
Round 1 0.0000 0.0001  0.0004  0.0009  0.0016  0.0025  0.0036  0.7208  0.7378  0.7551  0.7726  0.7903  0.8082  0.8262  0.8836  0.9025  0.9216  0.9409  0.9604  0.9801  1.0000  
Round 2 0.0000  0.0001  0.0003  0.0007  0.0013  0.0019  0.0028  0.5529  0.5494  0.5622  0.5752  0.5840  0.5972  0.6059  0.6479  0.6592  0.6720  0.6854  0.6993  0.7136  0.6830  
Round 3 0.0000  0.0001  0.0003  0.0007  0.0012  0.0018  0.0026  0.4990  0.5108  0.5228  0.5192  0.5310  0.5389  0.5510  0.5848  0.5950  0.6064  0.6186  0.6311  0.6041  0.5757  
Round 4 0.0000  0.0001  0.0003  0.0007  0.0012  0.0018  0.0024  0.4768  0.4881  0.4718  0.4827  0.4793  0.4901  0.4973  0.5318  0.5390  0.5483  0.5588  0.5345  0.5092  0.4828  
Round 5 0.0000  0.0001  0.0003  0.0006  0.0011  0.0017  0.0024  0.4304  0.4406  0.4258  0.4357  0.4325  0.4423  0.4488  0.4800  0.4865  0.4949  0.4731  0.4506  0.4270  0.4025  
Round 6 0.0000  0.0001  0.0002  0.0005  0.0010  0.0013  0.0022  0.4315  0.3976  0.4069  0.4163  0.4022  0.4113  0.4081  0.4365  0.4424  0.4207  0.3996  0.3783  0.3563  0.3334  
Round 7 0.0000  0.0001  0.0002  0.0005  0.0009  0.0014  0.0019  0.3895  0.3987  0.3672  0.3757  0.3630  0.3712  0.3683  0.3939  0.3749  0.3548  0.3352  0.3155  0.2951  0.2738  
 
Considering the negotiation outcome of a risk-loving seller and a risk-averting buyer, the buyer came 
up with measures P(α21) to P(α 6) at the left side of the table from round 1 to 7, whereas the seller 
proposed measures P(α 8) to P(α 6) at the right side of the table. 
The buyer rejected the measures proposed by the seller from round 1 to 6 before giving in to the 
demand of the seller. Similarly, the seller made a concession due to the delay penalty and change in 
CF; thus resulting in the agreement of both sides on negotiating measures and reaching a conclusion 
in round 7 with measure P(α 6). 
Tables 17 and 18 show the negotiation process of a risk-loving seller and a risk-neutral buyer as well 
as of a risk-loving seller and a buyer, respectively. 
 
<Table 17> The process of negotiation of a risk-loving seller and a risk-neutral buyer 
 P(α21) P(α20) P(α19) P(α18) P(α17) P(α16) P(α15) P(α7) P(α6) P(α5) P(α4) P(α3) P(α2) P(α1) P(α14) P(α13) P(α12) P(α11) P(α10) P(α9) P(α8) 
Round 1 0.0000  0.0001  0.0004  0.0009  0.0016  0.0025  0.0036  0.7208  0.7378  0.7551  0.7726  0.7903  0.8082  0.8262  0.8836  0.9025  0.9216  0.9409  0.9604  0.9801  1.0000  
Round 2 0.0000  0.0001  0.0003  0.0007  0.0013  0.0019  0.0028  0.5529  0.5494  0.5622  0.5752  0.5840  0.5972  0.6059  0.6479  0.6592  0.6720  0.6854  0.6993  0.7136  0.7010  
Round 3 0.0000  0.0001  0.0003  0.0007  0.0012  0.0018  0.0025  0.4990  0.5108  0.5074  0.5192  0.5270  0.5389  0.5468  0.5848  0.5950  0.6064  0.6186  0.6311  0.6201  0.6082  
Round 4 0.0000  0.0001  0.0003  0.0006  0.0011  0.0017  0.0024  0.4504  0.4610  0.4718  0.4685  0.4793  0.4864  0.4973  0.5277  0.5390  0.5483  0.5588  0.5486  0.5380  0.5269  
Round 5 0.0000  0.0001  0.0003  0.0006  0.0010  0.0015  0.0021  0.4064  0.4161  0.4258  0.4229  0.4325  0.4390  0.4488  0.4763  0.4846  0.4939  0.4851  0.4758  0.4661  0.4556  
Round 6 0.0000  0.0001  0.0002  0.0005  0.0010  0.0013  0.0019  0.3884  0.3755  0.3843  0.3932  0.3904  0.3992  0.4050  0.4332  0.4390  0.4301  0.4213  0.4124  0.4030  0.3932  
Round 7 0.0000  0.0001  0.0002  0.0005  0.0009  0.0014  0.0018  0.3505  0.3588  0.3468  0.3549  0.3523  0.3603  0.3655  0.3909  0.3816  0.3732  0.3650  0.3566  0.3478  0.3387  
Round 8 0.0000  0.0000  0.0002  0.0004  0.0008  0.0012  0.0018  0.3163  0.3238  0.3130  0.3203  0.3180  0.3251  0.3299  0.3399  0.3312  0.3233  0.3156  0.3078  0.2996  0.2910  
Round 9 0.0000  0.0000  0.0002  0.0004  0.0007  0.0011  0.0016  0.3172  0.2923  0.2991  0.3060  0.2956  0.3023  0.3000  0.2975  0.2895  0.2809  0.2731  0.2654  0.2576  0.2496  
Round10 0.0000  0.0000  0.0002  0.0004  0.0006  0.0010  0.0014  0.2863  0.2931  0.2700  0.2762  0.2668  0.2632  0.2511  0.2580  0.2505  0.2425  0.2352  0.2281  0.2208  0.2134  
Round11 0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0003  0.0006  0.0009  0.0013  0.2584  0.2645  0.2707  0.2410  0.2380  0.2202  0.2162  0.2138  0.2067  0.1991  0.1921  0.1852  0.1782  0.1710  
 
<Table 18> The process of negotiation of a risk-loving seller and a risk-loving buyer 
 P(α21) P(α20) P(α19) P(α18) P(α17) P(α16) P(α15) P(α7) P(α6) P(α5) P(α4) P(α3) P(α2) P(α1) P(α14) P(α13) P(α12) P(α11) P(α10) P(α9) P(α8) 
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Round 1 0.0000  0.0001  0.0004  0.0009  0.0016  0.0025  0.0036  0.7208  0.7378  0.7551  0.7726  0.7903  0.8082  0.8262  0.8836  0.9025  0.9216  0.9409  0.9604  0.9801  1.0000  
Round 2 0.0000  0.0001  0.0003  0.0007  0.0013  0.0019  0.0028  0.5529  0.5494  0.5622  0.5752  0.5840  0.5972  0.6059  0.6479  0.6592  0.6720  0.6854  0.6993  0.7136  0.7101  
Round 3 0.0000  0.0001  0.0003  0.0007  0.0012  0.0017  0.0025  0.4990  0.4958  0.5074  0.5192  0.5270  0.5389  0.5468  0.5848  0.5950  0.6064  0.6186  0.6311  0.6281  0.6245  
Round 4 0.0000  0.0001  0.0003  0.0006  0.0011  0.0016  0.0022  0.4504  0.4475  0.4579  0.4685  0.4756  0.4864  0.4935  0.5277  0.5370  0.5473  0.5583  0.5554  0.5524  0.5489  
Round 5 0.0000  0.0001  0.0002  0.0005  0.0010  0.0014  0.0020  0.4064  0.4038  0.4133  0.4229  0.4293  0.4390  0.4454  0.4763  0.4846  0.4939  0.4913  0.4885  0.4856  0.4821  
Round 6 0.0000  0.0001  0.0002  0.0005  0.0009  0.0013  0.0018  0.3668  0.3755  0.3730  0.3816  0.3874  0.3962  0.4019  0.4299  0.4374  0.4348  0.4322  0.4294  0.4265  0.4232  
Round 7 0.0000  0.0001  0.0002  0.0004  0.0008  0.0012  0.0017  0.3311  0.3389  0.3366  0.3444  0.3496  0.3575  0.3628  0.3879  0.3850  0.3824  0.3799  0.3772  0.3743  0.3711  
Round 8 0.0000  0.0000  0.0002  0.0004  0.0007  0.0011  0.0015  0.2988  0.3059  0.3038  0.3108  0.3155  0.3227  0.3274  0.3415  0.3386  0.3361  0.3336  0.3310  0.3283  0.3252  
Round 9 0.0000  0.0000  0.0002  0.0004  0.0006  0.0010  0.0014  0.2696  0.2760  0.2825  0.2805  0.2870  0.2912  0.2977  0.3004  0.2977  0.2952  0.2928  0.2903  0.2876  0.2847  
Round10 0.0000  0.0000  0.0002  0.0003  0.0006  0.0009  0.0013  0.2434  0.2491  0.2550  0.2532  0.2590  0.2628  0.2687  0.2641  0.2615  0.2591  0.2568  0.2544  0.2518  0.2490  
Round11 0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0003  0.0005  0.0008  0.0012  0.2196  0.2248  0.2301  0.2285  0.2337  0.2372  0.2366  0.2320  0.2295  0.2273  0.2250  0.2227  0.2202  0.2175  
Round12 0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0003  0.0005  0.0007  0.0010  0.2099  0.2029  0.2077  0.2125  0.2109  0.2105  0.2082  0.2055  0.2013  0.1991  0.1970  0.1947  0.1924  0.1898  
Round13 0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0003  0.0005  0.0007  0.0011  0.1894  0.1939  0.1984  0.1872  0.1869  0.1805  0.1797  0.1803  0.1772  0.1747  0.1725  0.1703  0.1679  0.1655  
Round14 0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0002  0.0004  0.0007  0.0009  0.1899  0.1944  0.1751  0.1751  0.1645  0.1640  0.1579  0.1595  0.1567  0.1536  0.1511  0.1488  0.1465  0.1441  
 
5.Conclusion 
In this era where e-commerce is everywhere, selling and buying products through the Internet are no 
longer considered novel activities. Furthermore, even traditional produce markets strive to trade goods 
online by setting up Internet shopping malls. E-commerce overcame the time and space barriers of 
both sellers and consumers, sharply spreading and growing and taking advantage of the reduction in 
economic costs, convenience of use, easy access, and cost reduction in trade. 
Alongside the growth of e-commerce, people have been trying to make available online the trade 
methods used in the traditional market such as auctioning, reverse auctioning, and haggling.  
Nonetheless, an automated negotiation system that is good enough to be utilized online has yet to be 
realized.  
A series of studies on various negotiation systems for application to the e-commerce market were 
conducted. Some of these studies have been realized as negotiation systems such as Kasbah, 
Tete-a-Tete, Jango, etc. Still, very few studies realize multiattribute negotiation wherein more than 
three negotiation items are considered and come up with the complete automation of negotiation. 
In the e-commerce market, the involvement of people should be minimized since mindsets such as 
egocentricity and pride and limitations of time and space are difficult to control because of the very 
humanity of people. Against this backdrop, areas where humans are involved are very likely to be the 
bottleneck in the negotiation process. 
This study approached the negotiation issue in the stance of a buyer and a seller based on specific 
bargaining environments called customized manufacturing in order to resolve the problems in 
multiattribute automated negotiation. Various attributes of negotiation required in the negotiation 
environments of customized manufacturing were defined. In addition, the weight of each attribute was 
analyzed using the entropy criteria, and each preference value for various negotiating measures, 
calculated. 
In addition, to realize the decision-making process of a decision maker, the method of selecting the 
best negotiation alternative was researched by utilizing each negotiator’s utility function, penalty for 
delay considering the negotiation circumstances, and CF of the negotiation. Such process of selecting 
negotiation measures can be explored in the study on automated negotiation methodology, which aims 
to materialize the cognition system of humans and judgment ability in each situation. 
The generation of multiattribute negotiation alternatives and methods of selecting and proposing 
negotiating measures suggested in this study are expected to help develop a more sophisticated 
automated negotiation system later. 
In the follow-up research, a method of carrying out negotiation that considers the various situations 
of a deal shall be developed. 
A number of internal and external factors should be considered for negotiation. The negotiation 
situation varies according to the effect caused by each factor. Therefore, negotiation strategies 
befitting each negotiation situation are required in order to yield more fruit in a negotiation. This 
study failed to address the negotiation methods in the strategic aspect, however. Future studies are 
expected to supplement the research of negotiation strategies.  
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